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Abstract: 
In the past two decades the Latin American region has experienced a number of credit 
crises stemming from large sovereign debt levels and sharp currency devaluations. This 
study aims to discover whether or not the sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) in the Latin 
American region lead equity markets prior to these sovereign credit events. Through a 
sample of the seven largest Latin American economies and daily return data from 2001 to 
2018, I try to empirically test this question through a Generalized Least Squared model. 
The paper finds little significant evidence of CDS leading equity markets in price discovery 
prior to sovereign credit events. Additionally, the paper observes a potential momentum 
effect present amongst Latin American equity market returns. However, this effect is more 
likely serial correlation amongst equity market returns due to the illiquidity of these equity 
markets.  
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1. Introduction: 
 Berkshire Hathaway Chairman and famous investor Warren Buffett notoriously 
referred to credit default swaps (CDS) as “financial weapons of mass destruction.” Other 
individuals describe CDS as analogous to “taking out fire insurance on a neighbor’s home.”1 
During the Global Financial Crisis, CDS played a central role in the bankruptcies of Lehman 
Brothers and AIG following the crash of the subprime mortgage market. Despite their 
central role in the Global Financial Crisis, CDS have also had positive effects on capital 
markets: they provide investors with a liquid market to trade credit risk and demonstrate 
the ability to capture information yet to be priced in stocks or bonds. This paper aims to 
explore the information captured by sovereign CDS and the extent to which this market is 
more efficient than local equity markets in pricing sovereign credit risk events. 
Since the advent of these credit derivatives in 1994, the outstanding notional 
amount of CDS contracts peaked at $61.2 trillion in 2007 and fell to $9.4 trillion dollars in 
2017.2 A CDS is a contract in which the buyer purchases insurance on the default risk of a 
reference entity’s debt. The main components that define a CDS contract are the reference 
entity, a list of credit events that trigger the protection payment, the term or maturity of the 
contract, the reference obligation, and the notional amount of the contract.3 The reference 
entity can be either a corporate or sovereign creditor. During the time of the Eurozone 
Crisis, the notional amount outstanding of sovereign CDS peaked at over $3 trillion. By 
2017, the notional amount of sovereign CDS dropped to around $1.5 trillion, but grew to 
                                                 
1 Maiello.  
2 Aldasoro.  
3 Tuckman, 545. 
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around 15% of the overall CDS market. The reference obligation is a specified debt 
obligation of the reference entity. CDS are available in maturities of 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, and 10 
years, although the 5-year CDS is the most liquid.4 Exhibit 1 provides the current makeup of 
the CDS market and its historical growth while Exhibit 2 provides a list of generally 
accepted credit events by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA). 
A CDS buyer will make periodic payments, referred to as the CDS spread, to the CDS 
seller for the duration of the contract, or until a “credit event” occurs. These payments 
come from an annualized spread of basis points on the notional amount of the contract. If 
there is a credit event, the CDS seller agrees to buy the reference entity’s debt from the 
buyer for the face value of the contract.5 The CDS spread increases – and thus purchasing 
CDS protection becomes more expensive – as the creditworthiness of the reference entity 
deteriorates.  
In recent years, the CDS market has shown to be a better source of pricing 
information than other markets. Academics have observed that the CDS market can be a 
superior source of credit risk information than both credit ratings and bond yield default 
spreads (Blanco et al., 2005; Norden and Weber, 2004; Flannery et al., 2010; Hull et al., 
2004). In prior years, investors focused on information provided by credit rating agencies 
and reference entity borrowing costs as chief credit risk indicators. However, the relative 
illiquidity of bond markets and rating agencies’ failure to adequately convey default risk 
compelled investors to look elsewhere for credit risk indicators. The CDS market was a 
                                                 
4 Hull,  571. 
5 This is only the case in contracts with physical settlement. Under the now more common cash settlement, 
ISDA organizes a formal auction process in which the cash payoff to the CDS buyer is determined by the 
cheapest-to-deliver (CTD) bond after the credit event. In this case, the buyer’s cash proceed is the loss given 
default times the face value of the CTD bond. 
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good place to start since the market was (and still is) more liquid than bond markets and 
the probability of default (PD) of reference entities is reflected in current market prices 
rather than periodic rating changes.  
This study aims to add to previous studies focusing on the anticipation of adverse 
credit events in both CDS and equity markets. More specifically, I intend to contribute to 
existing literature by focusing on the sovereign CDS markets rather than corporate CDS 
markets. The Eurozone crisis showed the adverse effects of sovereign credit risk and there 
have been many post-hoc studies looking at market fluctuations during the period (Afonso 
et al, 2012; da Silva, 2014). I expand on these previous studies and analyze the reaction of 
sovereign CDS and equity markets prior to credit events.  The central question I hope to 
answer is whether the sovereign CDS markets leads equity markets in price discovery 
during credit events. 
Moreover, instead of focusing on the Eurozone or other developed markets, this 
study focuses on emerging markets (EM) in Latin America. My decision to choose this 
sample set was driven by both the less developed literature on this region and the more 
volatile nature of this region’s CDS markets. The Latin American region has gone through a 
number of financial crises over the past twenty five years. These crises include Argentina’s 
defaults in 2001 and 2014, Mexico’s Tequila Crisis in 1995, Venezuela’s default in 2017, 
and the Global Financial Crisis in 2008. While this paper will not cover all of these 
individual examples, it will provide insight on the nature of Latin American sovereign 
credit risk and market reaction prior to sovereign credit events. 
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The importance of this study is based on the higher risk assumed by emerging 
market investors. EM investors tend to take on risky, more volatile positions in developing 
markets. This is perhaps to exploit the ability to generate higher yields while developed 
markets are in a steady state – the “reaching for yield” phenomenon. For example, during 
periods of falling interest rates, an investor can buy sovereign bonds from a non-
investment grade country and be able to both generate higher yields and capitalize on 
falling interest rates.6  
However, investing in EM leaves investors exposed to risk factors such as political 
instability, liquidity risk, and potential corporate governance issues in some of the 
individual investment prospects. In times of pronounced market volatility, this makes the 
potential losses in emerging markets much higher than developed markets and leads to a 
“flight to quality and liquidity,” whereby investors shift the allocation of their money 
towards low-risk, liquid assets. This means that a more volatile region like Latin America 
will be the first to experience a widespread market sell-off during times of economic 
uncertainty or volatility. Furthermore, the absence of developed liquid markets in Latin 
American makes it difficult for investors to sell off their positions without having to take 
losses on their investments. Through looking at the nature of sovereign CDS and equity 
markets in Latin America, this paper can help pinpoint certain patterns to help EM 
investors notice and anticipate future market behavior before a detrimental credit event 
occurs. 
                                                 
6 Bond prices increase as interest rates fall, so investors gain from both higher yields and price appreciation 
perspective. 
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Through a sample of seven Latin American countries, I assess how corresponding 
sovereign CDS and equity markets move prior to “credit events” in the sample countries. In 
order to empirically test this, I will use a Generalized Least Squared (GLS) regression to 
look at the movements of both markets prior to “credit events.” This follows the same 
econometric analysis used to investigate the presence of trading in CDS markets under 
normal and adverse market conditions (Acharya and Johnson, 2007; Berndt and 
Ostrovnaya, 2014; Qiu and Yu, 2012). Unlike the aforementioned studies, which focus on 
corporate credit risk, my paper focuses on the nature of sovereign credit risk. This 
fundamental difference could alter my results based on the different risk drivers of the two 
reference entities. Corporate credit risk is driven by firm-specific default risk, which is 
driven by metrics like leverage and asset volatility (Merton, 1974). Sovereign credit risk is 
more tied to macroeconomic factors like foreign exchange rates and geopolitical factors. 
Additionally, sovereign credit risk is also linked to U.S. market fundamentals like the CBOE 
Volatility Index (VIX) and U.S. high yield indices (Longstaff et al., 2011) Furthermore, my 
focus is on Latin American markets, which are less liquid than those in the U.S., might 
change the results of the study.  
The results of this study show little significant evidence of CDS innovations leading 
equity market returns prior to a credit event. There was little indication of CDS innovations 
influencing equity returns prior to sovereign credit events for the entire sample. However, 
when splitting the sample of countries into those that were investment grade and non-
investment grade, the study showed that CDS innovations do lead equity returns five and 
30 days prior to a sovereign credit event. Furthermore, the study found results consistent 
with a serial correlation in Latin American equity market returns. The coefficient sum 
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indicating this serial correlation was larger within the sample of investment grade 
countries and is very likely attributed to the absence of liquidity in underdeveloped Latin 
American equity markets (de la Torre and Schmukler, 2006).  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 analyzes the relevant 
literature used to conduct this research and states the relevant hypotheses. Section 3 will 
describe the methodology through specifying the data collection process and describing the 
model specifications used to empirically test the hypotheses. Section 4 will describe the 
results from the econometric analysis. Lastly, Section 5 will make concluding remarks on 
the results and explain certain areas that could be further investigated in future research.  
2. Literature Review:  
The core of this paper focuses on the efficiency of credit derivatives markets and 
equity markets in Latin American countries. Therefore, the majority of the relevant 
literature focuses on sovereign CDS, sovereign credit risk, emerging market equity markets, 
and the relationship between CDS and equity markets. Since most of the available literature 
looks at the empirical relationship at the firm level, my paper will try to analyze things at a 
more aggregate macro level. 
2.1. The Relationship Between CDS and Equity Markets: 
 The first part of the literature relevant in this paper is that regarding the 
relationship and information flow between CDS and equity markets. Since a CDS contract is 
essentially insurance protection against the outstanding debt of a reference entity, this 
relationship reduces to the relationship between the two sources of funding: debt and 
equity. Merton (1974) first looked at the relationship between debt and equity as 
contingent claims on firm assets. Through the Merton (1974) Model, he was able to map 
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out probability of default as a nonlinear function of the assets’ market value, asset 
volatility, and the debt-to-equity ratio. As such, the correlation between the return on both 
securities should increase as PD increases. From the model one should also be able to 
determine the CDS spread while any deviations in these expected returns would mean that 
there are model specifications or potential arbitrage opportunities.7 
Longstaff et al. (2005) looked at the relationship between equity, CDS, and bond 
markets and observed that both stocks and CDS lead the corporate bond markets, but did 
not find any indication on whether or not one market consistently leads the other. Norden 
and Weber (2004) studied the cointegration between CDS, equity, and bond markets. The 
study concluded that the CDS market is the strongest contributor to price discovery and 
that the negative intertemporal relationship between CDS and equity returns is more 
strongly pronounced for firms with lower creditworthiness. Although both results provide 
insight on the CDS and equity relation in corporate bonds, there was no indication on this 
relation at the sovereign level or how this relationship might differ in the presence of 
adverse credit conditions. 
 Afonso et al. (2012), explored the reaction of sovereign CDS and sovereign bond 
yield spreads before and after credit rating announcements in a sample of European 
countries. The study observed that the reaction of sovereign CDS spreads to negative rating 
events increased after the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. The study also noted that there is 
no anticipation of rating and outlook announcement 1-2 months prior, but there is 
evidence of bidirectional causality between credit ratings and CDS spreads in a 1-2 week 
                                                 
7 The Merton Model assumes that volatility is constant. This means that with increasing asset volatility, CDS 
and equity returns could both be positive, which makes model misspecifications more likely. 
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window. Lastly, the study concluded that between two countries with the same rating, the 
one that had been downgraded in the past six months carried a much higher CDS spread. 
While the study did not observe any anticipation of rating announcements the 1-2 months 
prior, it might be because a credit event itself extends to far more than a sovereign rating 
downgrade. Perhaps the “credit event” entails the CDS markets significantly moving prior 
to the announcement could be the “credit event” itself. 
Acharya and Johnson (2007) investigated insider trading in CDS markets. In their 
study, they observed statistically significant information flow between CDS and equity 
markets with firms that are likely to have a credit event in the future. This information flow 
is even greater for firms that actually experience some sort of credit deterioration. Their 
study, however, did not find that insider trading had significantly adverse effects on 
liquidity provisions in the credit markets. Only Acharya and Johnson applied the study 
within the context of market distress and found conditions as to how markets react under 
adverse conditions. Furthermore the study provided a more flexible definition of “credit 
event”, which considers the market movement prior to a rating announcement the credit 
event itself. My study differs from theirs in that the reference entities of focus are 
sovereigns rather than corporates. Furthermore, my study is not centered on investing 
insider trading activity in the markets. 
Qiu and Yu (2011) replicated Acharya and Johnson’s (2007) for the determination of 
liquidity provision in the single-name CDS market. From a sample of 732 reference entities 
from 2001 to 2008, they observed that CDS innovations lead stock returns prior to large 
changes in CDS spreads. Furthermore, the coefficient used to measure the lead-lag 
relationship gets larger as the credit event gets closer and the conditional information flow 
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from CDS to equity markets is stronger when isolating the dates close to the Global 
Financial Crisis and thereafter. These results suggest that there is greater information flow 
from CDS to equity markets when the CDS market is more liquid. Batta et al. (2016) find 
that U.S. corporate CDS lead stocks ahead of earnings announcements and analyst forecasts 
have become more accurate after the advent of CDS. The information of these two studies is 
relevant because perhaps these presence of insiders in the CDS markets makes this market 
more informational.  
Chan et al. (2009) observed the absence of CDS and equity cointegration amongst a 
sample of Asian countries. What this means is that there is a deviation from the expected 
negative correlation between CDS and equity markets. Because the stock markets are less 
developed in many of these countries, price discovery took place in CDS markets primarily. 
The reason for this might be due to serial correlation of daily stock returns, which means 
CDS and equity prices could move in the same direction because of the difficulty in 
executing large buy or sell orders. Accompanied by the development of the credit 
derivatives market, the lack of cointegration allows investors to exploit arbitrage 
opportunities that would otherwise not exist in an efficient market. In Latin America, 
equity markets are less developed and it would be interesting to see if there is also a lack of 
cointegration in the region. 
Chan-Lau et al. (2004) found that no arbitrage causes convergence between CDS and 
credit spreads, which means that CDS and bond yield spreads will converge in such a way 
that investor will be unable to profit from arbitrage opportunities. However, for most EM 
there was no cointegration between bond spreads and equity prices and CDS and equity 
prices. This means that it is possible to observe some form of deviation (or lag) between 
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CDS and local equity markets. The paper also found CDS have an edge over bond markets in 
price discovery, which reflects the illiquidity of bonds.8 It would be interesting to see if 
these behaviors are consistent within the lesser developed equity markets in Latin 
America. 
2.2.  Price Discovery of Credit Risk: 
Blanco et al. (2005) looked at CDS basis deviations in a sample of investment grade 
firms in the United States and Europe and found strong evidence of CDS spreads leading 
credit spreads.9 A strong explanation for this observation was the CDS market being an 
overall better market to trade credit risk than the sovereign bond market. This is because 
bonds are often held until maturity, while CDS contracts are more heavily traded. In 
addition, the study concluded that corporate CDS spreads are strongly influenced by factors 
of idiosyncratic risk. The study, however, did not look at either sovereign CDS markets or 
below investment-grade markets. Because carrying a speculative credit rating might make 
the bond market even less liquid, it would be interesting to study the relationship in the 
context of sovereign entities that carry different default risk profiles. 
 Wengner et al. (2015), studied the impact of S&P Global rating announcements on a 
sample of corporate firms.  Their study is consistent with results observed in the past, 
observing a positive median increase (CAS) in CDS spreads of 1.70 basis points i two days 
before credit rating downgrades and -0.79 basis points around credit rating upgrades. 
Creighton et al. (2004), studied the reaction of bond and equity markets to rating 
announcements in Australia. Their study observed that corporate firms subject to 
                                                 
8 Most bonds are held to maturity, so they are illiquid compared to CDS, which are more heavily traded. 
9 The credit spread is the spread between the bond’s yield and the risk-free rate, so this would imply a serious 
problem with relying on credit spreads as credit risk indicators. 
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downgrades on average underperformed the market by around 12% within their 
designated estimation window. On the announcement day and the subsequent day, stocks 
experience a negative cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of -1.3%, which is small 
compared to what is seen in the longer window. 
  Martell (2005), observed that local stock indices for 29 emerging economies react to 
negative sovereign rating announcements in a statistically significant manner and S&P 
ratings were more informative than those from Moody’s. Although the study is consistent 
with previous studies, it does not provide additional insight on whether or not local stock 
indices lead or lag sovereign credit rating changes. Furthermore, it is very likely that the 
market has already reacted to the credit event before the rating agencies announce their 
analysis on the situation. As a result, it makes sense to look at where the markets are 
moving prior to this in order to paint a better picture of this relationship. 
Kaminsky et al. (2001), studied emerging market behavior for both stocks and 
bonds in response to credit rating changes. As part of the event study they looked at a time 
frame of +/-10 days prior to the rating announcement and observed that equity markets 
decline around 7% in the window before the rating announcement. 
With regards to the difference between sovereign and corporate CDS spreads, 
Packer et al. (2003), investigated the difference between sovereign and corporate CDS 
spreads for Emerging Market economies. From their study they concluded that there is 
asymmetry between the pricing of each type of CDS depending on the credit rating of the 
sovereign. For highly rated sovereigns, CDS spreads were generally lower than those for 
similarly rated corporations. For low-rated sovereigns, however, CDS spreads were on 
average much higher than those for similarly rated corporates. While the direction and 
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degree of deviation is different, the same information could be observed in the sovereign 
CDS than what was observed previously for corporate firms. 
Flannery et al. (2010) looked at whether CDS spreads are a viable substitute for 
credit ratings. In their study they observed that in 2007, certain financial institutions’ CDS 
spreads reflected significantly more risk than equity prices. This was a major early warning 
indicator of the subsequent economic fallout. Although the study provided insight in the 
viability of CDS spreads as early warning indicators, it was limited to American financial 
institutions and does not extend to below investment-grade entities. Hull et al. (2004) 
found that CDS changes contain relevant information about the probability of a credit 
rating downgrades. The study was predominantly focused on corporates and was 
consistent with the notion that credit rating agencies prefer stable rating transitions to 
avoid moving the markets. 
Zhang (2003) noted that when Argentina defaulted in 2001, the credit rating 
agencies lagged the credit market. More specifically, the PD reflected in credit ratings was 
much lower than the PD reflected in CDS prices. Furthermore, they studied three “implied 
state variables” that showed correlations with the negative slope of the U.S. treasury term 
structure, the 10-year treasury yield, and a spread of the 10-year yield and JP Morgan EMBI 
Index respectively. This is important to note because deteriorations in developed markets 
most often lead to a “flight to quality” and “flight to liquidity” movements in which 
investors go for safe and less volatile securities during times of financial distress. 
At country level, da Silva (2014), looked at the relationship between sovereign 
credit risk and stock index performance of Eurozone countries the correlation between 
CDS and stock index returns does not get stronger with sovereign financial distress.  
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2.3. Equity Markets in Latin America: 
Although many economists and policy makers once had optimistic prospects for 
capital market development in Latin America, countries in the region are still plagued by 
illiquid equity markets where trading is concentrated on a small number of firms. De la 
Torre and Schmukler (2006) studied the effect of institutional reform on the development 
of Latin American capital markets. Their study observed that market size in terms of 
capitalization is limited to only a few firms and an increasing number of firms have actually 
opted to list on foreign markets in New York and London. Furthermore, they note that the 
response to institutional financial reforms are even more underwhelming when compared 
to the development of equity markets in East Asian economies.  
An OECD study (2017) notes two different theories behind the underdevelopment 
of Latin American equity markets. Firstly, companies are afraid that taking initial or 
secondary listings will not receive a sufficient value relative to other funding sources. This 
indicates that shareholders command a high rate of return on their investment, which 
makes it costly for the company. Additionally, Latin American countries struggle with deep 
systematic corruption issues, which in turn make investors reluctant to undertake 
investments with potential exposure to many corporate governance issues. These issues 
combined with a number of domestic corporations opting to list abroad holds back equity 
markets from having the serious booms that other EM equity markets have experienced 
since 1990. 
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2.4. Hypotheses: 
From the available literature and past studies analyzed, I hypothesize the following 
results: 
H1: CDS returns will lead equity index returns in the sample of Latin American 
countries. 
H2: Prior to a sovereign “credit event”, the reaction proposed in H1 will be even 
stronger. 
H3: During times of sovereign credit events, the reaction proposed in H1 will be 
more severe for countries that are already below investment grade. 
3. Methodology: 
 The seven countries of focus in this study are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela. These countries were chosen because of their status as the 
seven largest economies in Latin America (LAC-7). These countries have varying levels of 
creditworthiness, which allows me to test if CDS and equity market reactions vary 
depending on the country’s current perceived credit risk. Of the sample countries, Chile, 
Colombia, Mexico, and Peru are investment grade while Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela 
are speculative. Therefore, the empirical analysis will investigate the effects both in the 
context of the entire sample of countries and in the context of two sub-samples split 
between investment-grade and speculative grade countries.  
Data for this study is split into three components: stock index returns and five-year 
sovereign CDS spreads on U.S. Dollar-denominated debt. The stock indices used are the 
following: Merval Index (Argentina), Bovespa Index (Brazil), S&P/CLX IGPA Index (Chile), 
COLCAP Index (Colombia), S&P/BMV Index (Mexico), S&P/BVL Index (Peru), and IBVC 
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Index (Venezuela). The return component for the indices is the daily percent change in 
closing prices quoted in USD. The data downloaded from Bloomberg on daily index returns, 
included dividends. For the regression lags, I took up to five lags for CDS changes, Index 
returns, and the CDS innovation variables. Lastly, I created three different credit dummy 
variables. The purpose of these variables was to indicate if the two market return for the 
countries in the sample fell within 5 days, 30 days, or 90 days before a “credit event.”  The 
reason for this was not only to determine if there is information flow from CDS to equity 
markets prior to a credit event, but how far behind one can anticipate this reaction if 
present. The model defines the credit condition dummy under two different specifications. 
I used Bloomberg to obtain the data on sovereign CDS changes and equity index 
returns. The time window of this data ranges from 2001 until 2018. The reason for this 
time period is because it is the earliest the data on CDS spreads was available and it covers 
market turmoil periods such as the Global Financial Crisis and credit deterioration in 
countries like Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela. I had to drop some observations because 
there were missing observations for equity index prices on some of the corresponding 
dates for CDS spreads. The most likely reason for these missing observations was national 
holidays. On these dates local equity markets were probably closed while sovereign CDS 
were still trading globally. In total the entire data se ended up consisting of 26,431 
observations. For the econometric analysis of the data sample, I used STATA under both 
the panel and time series packages. Descriptive statistics for each country are displayed in 
Table 1 and graphs of CDS and equity market prices are in Exhibit 5.  
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The first step of the analysis entails examining the individual correlation of CDS and 
equity market returns. More specifically, for each country in the sample, the correlation 
will be between CDS returns and lagged equity market returns. For the range period, 
𝑘 = −5, −4, … , +5, the correlation between daily index returns at time 𝑡 + 𝑘 and 
contemporaneous percent changes in CDS prices at time t would imply information from 
equity to CDS markets.  
 Similar to Acharya and Johnson (2007), the first part of the empirical test is 
examining the pure effect of CDS changes at time 𝑡 on index returns at time 𝑡 + 𝑘.  This 
entails isolating the information that the CDS market captures before the equity market. 
The first step to doing this is regressing changes in CDS spreads on contemporaneous stock 
returns and isolate the residual component. This is done through separate time series 
regressions for each country, along with five lags for both CDS changes and stock returns to 
obtain any lagged information transmission in the credit market. For this regression, CDS 
returns are the log difference between CDS spreads over a two-day period. Based on the 
Merton (1974) Model and Acharya and Johnson (2007), the relation between CDS changes 
and index returns should be nonlinear.  
To examine the pure effect of CDS returns on future stock returns, I ran individual 
time series regressions for each country i in the sample.  As part of this, I regressed CDS 
returns on some constant, five lags of CDS returns, contemporaneous index returns, the 
product of the return and the reciprocal CDS spread, and five lags of the previous two 
terms. The interpretation for the residual term, 𝑢𝑖𝑡 (referred to as CDS innovation 
hereafter) is unique information arriving in CDS markets that can be helpful in predicting 
future equity market returns. 
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(𝐶𝐷𝑆 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + ∑ [𝛽𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 +
𝛾𝑖,𝑘
(𝐶𝐷𝑆 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙)𝑖,𝑡
] (𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖,𝑡−𝑘
5
𝑘=0
 
       + ∑ 𝛿𝑖,𝑡−𝑘(𝐶𝐷𝑆 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡
5
𝑘=1
 (1) 
The next step in the analysis involves determining information flow from CDS to 
equity markets. The regression used for this is a panel regression of contemporaneous 
index returns on five lags CDS innovations, the product of those five lags and a credit 
dummy variable, five lags of index returns, and the product of the five index return lags and 
the credit dummy variable. The dummy variable indicates whether one of the countries in 
the sample experienced a credit event during the sample period. The panel regression 
looks as follows: 
(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + ∑[𝑏𝑘 + 𝑏𝑘
𝐷(𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦)𝑡](𝐶𝐷𝑆 𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)𝑡−𝑘
5
𝑘=1
 
                                                     + ∑[𝑐𝑘 + 𝑐𝑘
𝐷(𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦)𝑡](𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
5
𝑘=1
(2) 
The terms ∑ 𝑏𝑘
5
𝑘=1  and ∑ 𝑏𝑘
𝐷5
𝑘=1  respectively measure unconditional and conditional 
permanent information flows from CDS to equity markets. What this allows us to do is look 
at the sampled countries as having the same dynamic properties with the exception of the 
conditioning provided by the lagged response terms. More importantly, the interpretation 
of the coefficient ∑ (𝑏𝑘 + 𝑏𝑘
𝐷)5𝑘=1  measures information flow from the CDS to equity markets 
conditional on some credit event happening in the future. 
Under Acharya and Johnson’s (2007) model, the specification for a credit event 
included any one-day increase in CDS spreads over 50 basis points. However, within the 
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LAC-7 sample there were over 600 instances of this specification. These was very likely 
attributed to the volatile nature of some of the countries in the region, so this specification 
needed some modifications to provide a more accurate representation. As a result the 
specification for the credit event was a one-day jump exceeding 50 basis points for 
investment-grade countries and a one-day jump exceeding 100 basis points for non-
investment-grade countries. After that, I established three different windows of five, 30, 
and 90 days prior to the credit event where the credit condition dummy took the value of 
one if the lagged dates corresponded to the respective time window. 
Additionally, I also provided an additional specification that follows what Berndt 
and Ostrovnaya (2008) and Qiu and Yu (2011) used to define credit events. This 
specification defines a credit event as a one-day increase in CDS spreads satisfying the 
following condition: 
∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖𝑡 > 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒(∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖) + 4 ∙ 𝑠𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑣(∆𝐶𝐷𝑆𝑖) 
What this alternate specification does is account for the scale of variation in each of the 
LAC-7’s sovereign CDS spreads. Implementing this definition showed credit events for 
stable countries like Chile and Peru in which the one-day increase was less than 50 basis 
points and ruled out credit events for unstable countries like Argentina and Venezuela in 
which the one-day increase in CDS spreads was greater than 100 basis points. 
Once all these events were accounted for, I proceeded by eliminating events that 
were very close to each other. Since one can expect the markets to be more volatile after 
the credit event, I took the earliest date in these “clusters” and defined that as the date of 
the credit event. Just as with the previous specification, I established three different 
windows of five, 30, and 90 days prior to the credit event where the credit condition 
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dummy took the value of one if the lagged dates corresponded to the respective time 
window. 
In order to look at this issue further, I decided re-run the same regressions on two 
different sub-samples: investment grade countries and non-investment grade countries. 
There is a large gap in perceived sovereign credit risk between some of the countries in the 
LAC-7 sample. For example, Chile and Mexico are large, more stable economies in the 
region while Venezuela and Argentina have a notorious history for debt crises and 
economic meltdowns. As a result, splitting the sample up might identify if different Latin 
American markets react in different ways based on already perceived credit risk from 
rating agency sentiment. 
4. Results: 
4.1. Individual Correlation between Contemporaneous CDS returns and Lagged Equity 
Market Returns: 
From a preliminary correlation analysis, we can see some degree of negative 
correlation between CDS returns and future equity returns. This negative correlation varies 
from country to country, but the results appear to be the strongest in the case of Colombia 
and Peru. The negative correlation appears most frequently with the contemporaneous 
CDS return and the equity market returns for the two following days. What this appears to 
show is that CDS returns might have certain information that takes an additional two days 
to be priced into equity market returns. However, this negative correlation does not appear 
to show between contemporaneous CDS and equity market returns. This might be 
attributed to the macro nature of this research question. There might be enough companies 
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traded in these indices to diversify away firm-specific risk, which appears with single-name 
CDS and equity returns. The correlation matrices for each country are shown in Table 2. 
4.2. Results from First Stage Regression: 
The results from the first stage time series regression show that contemporaneous 
CDS returns are explained mostly by the CDS return of the prior day, the contemporaneous 
equity index return and that of the day before, as well as the past two lags of the CDS 
product (Results in Table 3). The r-squared of these regressions range from 5-44%, which 
show that a significant amount of the variation (at least half for every country in the 
sample) in CDS returns is not explained by the model.  
The country with the highest r-squared in our sample was Brazil (0.44) while the 
lowest was Venezuela (5%). These results make sense when considering the size and 
robustness of the respective stock markets. There is not a lot of trading in Venezuela’s 
stock market relative to its GDP. Furthermore, Venezuela is a country devastated by 
hyperinflation and market unfriendly policies. As a result, it is reasonable to expect that 
CDS returns will be influenced more by macroeconomic fundamentals, geopolitical activity, 
and country-relevant factors like oil prices and volatility. On the other hand, Brazil has the 
largest economy in Latin America and the stock market with the highest trading activity 
relative to GDP. Therefore, it is more reasonable to expect that sovereign credit risk 
reflected in CDS prices will can be better explained by factors related to equity returns. 
Exhibit 4 shows stock market activity as a percentage of GDP for all LAC-7 countries. 
The portion of CDS returns that remains to be explained, is the CDS innovation 
coefficient that is plugged into the second stage regression of the analysis. The intention of 
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this variable is to try and see if this unique information in CDS prices does in fact lead Latin 
American equity markets prior to sovereign credit events.  
4.3. Results for the Entire Sample of LAC-7 Countries: 
The sum of the lagged coefficients from the secondary regression of the entire LAC-7 
sample are summarized in Table 4. The secondary regression of the entire sample shows 
that there is no significant unconditional information flow from CDS to equity markets. In 
other words, ∑ 𝑏𝑘 
5
𝑘=1 is essentially equal to zero. These results are consistent with what 
Acharya and Johnson (2007). 
The main result of interest, however, is whether there is information flow from CDS 
to equity markets prior to a credit event.  The sum of lagged CDS innovations, ∑ (𝑏𝑘 +
5
𝑘=1
𝑏𝑘
𝐷), is negative for some of the specifications in the sample and positive for others. Under 
the entire LAC-7 sample, there is only statistical significance for the flow effect, ∑ 𝑏𝑘
𝐷 ,5𝑘=1  
five days before a credit event defined by Specification A. This flow effect demonstrates 
around 6.6% information transmission from CDS innovations to equity markets. Ultimately, 
these results do not give compelling evidence of lagged CDS innovations predicting equity 
returns during sovereign credit events. 
The direction of this coefficient, however, is unexpectedly positive. Given the 
negative correlation between CDS and equity returns, one would expect that statistically 
significant lagged CDS innovations prior to a credit event would lead to negative future 
equity market returns. Both Acharya and Johnson (2007) and Qiu and Yu (2011) found the 
summed coefficients to be negative for this case. This deviation in my results could be due 
to a number of reasons. Mainly, their studies focused on individual firms for which CDS 
innovations represent idiosyncratic risk. Since this study looks at sovereign CDS and equity 
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index returns, the risk measured is systematic. Additionally, Acharya and Johnson (2007) 
sought to determine if insiders (mainly large financial institutions) were using the CDS 
market to trade on private information. At a sovereign level, perhaps there are little or no 
individuals with insider information. This makes sense because information relating to 
sovereign credit risk is publically available, allowing anyone to hypothetically trade this 
information.  Additionally, despite their relative liquidity to bonds, CDS are still thinly 
traded. As a result, investors trading sovereign CDS might not be trading a large enough 
size carry a spillover effect into local equity markets. These results show some, although 
not an overwhelming amount, of evidence that sovereign CDS price in information about 
credit quality deterioration prior to equity markets. 
Lastly, both Acharya and Johnson (2007) and Qiu and Yu (2012) found that there 
was negative serial correlation in this regression. Inside the credit condition dummy 
period, this is the period in which CDS spreads keep going up while stock prices fall. In the 
context of their study this corresponds to insiders buying CDS while uninformed traders 
continue to buy shares for the corresponding reference entity. In my results, there was a 
positive serial correlation, which is likely attributed to market illiquidity. Therefore, this 
positive serial correlation is reflected in the positive coefficient for the flow component. 
Since there is less liquidity in Latin American equity markets, it might take several days to 
execute a large trade order. From this observation, it might be beneficial to use monthly 
data on CDS and equity returns to address this issue. 
The coefficients ∑ 𝑐𝑘
5
𝑘=1  and ∑ 𝑐𝑘
𝐷5
𝑘=1 indicate unconditional and conditional 
information transmission from past equity returns to future equity returns respectively. 
Under the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), these coefficients should both be zero. In our 
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model results, however, both coefficients showed statistical significance. The unconditional 
coefficient sum ∑ 𝑐𝑘
5
𝑘=1  was statistically significant for all of the different cases in Table 1 
except 90 days prior to the credit event defined by Specification B. The effect specified by 
these coefficients represents a magnitude of around 21%. The conditional coefficient sum  
∑ 𝑐𝑘
𝐷5
𝑘=1  was statistically significant 30 days prior to the credit event defined by 
Specification B. The effect of this coefficient is around 17%. These results indicate a 
potential momentum effect in Latin American equity market returns, which is consistent 
with what Muga and Santamaria (2007) found in their study. What this means is that 
theoretically investors in Latin American Markets can benefit from some trading strategy 
that buys “winners” and sells “losers,” and implementing this strategy during periods of 
adverse credit conditions could potentially yield even higher profits. 
However, given the relative illiquidity of Latin American equity markets, the 
statistical significance in this sum of coefficients is more likely attributed to serial 
correlation in Latin American equity market returns. De la Torre and Schmukler (2006) 
note that capital markets in Latin America are underdeveloped relative to not only 
developed countries but also EM in East Asia. They note that even with intense capital 
market reform, Latin American countries lack domestic activity in equity capital markets in 
terms of market cap, capital raising, and trading activity. Given the absence of significant 
trading activity in these markets, it could take a long period of time for a trader to execute a 
large buy or sell order. Since it takes a longer time for this trade order to go through, one 
could expect market prices to move in the same direction for a while, which generates the 
serial correlation observed in the results. Until higher activity on the three areas noted 
above injects liquidity to Latin America’s equity markets, the presence of serial correlation 
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in equity returns will persist. Because the length of the serial correlation effect is short (90 
days at its maximum according to the model results), it is difficult to ascertain that this is a 
true momentum effect in Latin American markets. When Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) 
found a momentum effect present in U.S. equity markets, the effect persisted for several 
months following. Furthermore, the effect was observed in the most liquid stock market in 
the world, which rules out potential serial correlation issues that could be present in Latin 
American markets.  
4.4. Results for Investment Grade Countries: 
Although the results observed in the regression for the entire LAC-7 sample show 
compelling results, especially regarding momentum return anomalies, there is still no 
strong evidence on either the informational power of sovereign CDS or how sovereign CDS 
might lead equity markets in price discovery prior to credit events in the region. When 
reducing the sample to only investment grade countries, we can see statistical significance 
in that unconditional CDS innovations are negative and statistically significant across the 
board. More specifically, the results demonstrate lagged CDS innovations (unconditional) 
having an effect of around 2-5% on contemporaneous equity market returns. All of these 
results are significant at a 1% level except 90 days before the credit event under 
Specification B (significant at a 10% level). The results from the investment grade sample 
are shown in Table 2 below.  
The sum of the coefficients on both lagged CDS innovations are mostly positive 
(driven by the larger and more positive coefficient on the flow effect). Lastly, the 
coefficients for the flow effect are statistically significant five and 30 days prior to a credit 
event under Specification A and five days prior to a credit event under Specification B. 
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These coefficients represent an information transmission from CDS innovations to equity 
returns of 7% and 12% under Specifications A and B respectively. The direction of the 
coefficient, however, is still positive.  
What these results might show is that there is a larger amount of trading occurring 
in higher credit quality markets. However, the group of markets that are part of this sample 
still remain among some of the least developed in the region (Peru, for example). As a 
result, what this might actually mean is that there is a more severe reaction to credit events 
in regions that are known for less volatility and higher credit quality. It might be that 
investors who enter more volatile markets like Argentina are aware of the country’s track 
record for credit crises and might already have this priced in. 
Similar to the results observed with the entire sample, there is also a statistically 
significant coefficient sum for unconditional equity market returns across the board. All 
coefficients are statistically significant at a 1% level and represent a magnitude of about 
30%, which is larger than what was observed with the entire LAC-7 sample. This again is 
indication of serial correlation in the sample returns. For the conditional lagged equity 
market returns, there is only statistical significance for this under Specification B and only 
30 and 90 days prior to the credit event. These coefficients represent a magnitude of 
around 10-15%. For the same reasons noted previously it is difficult to conclude that these 
are momentum returns rather than serial correlation. 
4.5. Results for Non-Investment Grade Countries: 
When run only with the sample of non-investment grade countries, the second 
regression did not show a lot of statistical significance. Firstly, the unconditional flow effect 
was statistically insignificant across the board. The conditional flow effect was only 
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statistically significant five days before a credit event under Specification A (5% level) and 
90 days before a credit event under Specification B (1% level). These two coefficients 
represent information flow from CDS innovations to equity markets of 6.7% and -6.2% 
respectively. In this instance there was a negative coefficient, which is what was originally 
expected, for the conditional information flow 90 days prior to the credit event.10 
 The reason why there might be less statistical significance for these results might be 
because there is little trading in the equity markets of non-investment grade Latin 
American countries. As noted by de la Torre and Schmukler. (2006), trading activity in 
Latin American equity markets is a small fraction than that in East Asia or developed 
markets. Value traded in domestic markets is still a small fraction of GDP. This is especially 
true for all the non-investment grade countries excluding Brazil. What this means is that 
the total value accounted for in stock market trading activity is not large enough to display 
statistically significant results for below-investment grade nations in the sample. This 
liquidity problem may be a strong hindrance in finding statistically significant results with 
the non-investment grade countries in the sample.  
With this sub-sample, there still appears to be serial correlation on lagged equity 
market returns, with statistically significant coefficients in the range of 22-24%. This is 
persistent for all cases of the regression except 90 days prior to a credit event under 
Specification B. The magnitude and level of statistical significance however, is lower than 
that observed for the sub-sample of investment grade countries. The reason this might be 
lower is due to the presence of Brazil in the sub-sample. Brazil’s stock market (BOVESPA) 
                                                 
10 For a lot of the statistically insignificant “flow effect” coefficients, the direction is negative, which shows 
something more in line with was originally expected. Perhaps this is something that needs to be further 
looked at. 
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has the most value traded relative to GDP. As a result, this shows at least a larger degree of 
liquidity relative to the other LAC-7 equity indices. Since Brazil’s stock market would at 
least be the most liquid in the entire sample, it might lower the degree of serial correlation 
observed in this sample.  
Lastly there is significant information flow in lagged equity returns to future equity 
returns 90 days prior to a credit event under Specification B. What this indicates is serial 
correlation in equity returns conditional on a credit event happening in the future, are only 
noticed 90 days in advance during our sampling period. This is mostly in line with the 
results from the entire LAC-7 sample and the investment grade sub-sample. Since serial 
correlation is already present absent of a credit event, the presence of a credit crisis down 
the line should not change this. However, given the more artificial nature of Specification B, 
there might be certain dates deemed as “credit events” that do not really meet the criteria 
of a sovereign credit event. As a result, it could be beneficial to find a more natural criteria 
to classify credit events given the list of macroeconomic factors that affect sovereign credit 
risk. 
When looking only at the investment grade sub-sample of countries, the regression 
results were different than the results from the entire LAC-7 sample. Mainly, there was 
consistent statistical significance for lagged unconditional CDS innovation and statistical 
significance for the conditional flow coefficient 30 and 90 days prior to the credit event. 
Isolating the sample to only below-investment grade does not really change the results from 
what was observed in the entire sample. 
The most likely reason for an absence of significant results is due to macro nature of 
this analysis. Past studies like Acharya and Johnson (2007) look at this relationship at a firm 
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level. The nature of their analysis was finding whether or there was insider trading in 
corporate CDS markets. These insiders would include large Financial Institutions or 
corporate insiders who realized that trading activity on private information in equity 
markets would ultimately be reported to the SEC. As a result, an OTC derivatives market 
would allow these individuals to maintain a degree of anonymity. The information affecting 
the single-name corporate CDS was private corporate information. As a result, single-name 
corporate CDS that are otherwise out of the public eye are prone to potential manipulation 
by insiders such as hedge funds and other financial institutions. 
For sovereign CDS spreads, information pertinent to sovereign credit risk is publically 
available and frequently traded on. News channels talk on upcoming elections, geopolitical 
tensions, foreign exchange rates, and other factors affecting sovereign credit risk. As a result, 
this information is available to all investors. Even though the sovereign CDS market is not 
the largest component of the entire CDS market, financial institutions and other investor 
closely follow this information to determine risks associated with corresponding 
government bonds and other securities. This fundamental difference is a potential reason 
for lacking significant information in the flow coefficient. 
Factors that affect sovereign CDS and EM equity returns are different than the 
idiosyncratic factors driving single-name corporate CDS and stock returns. Mainly these 
include macroeconomic variables like foreign exchange (FX) rates and U.S. market factors 
including corporate bond yields, high yield indices, and market volatility indicators, such as 
the VIX. As a result, it is perhaps these other factors that perhaps lead local equity index 
returns prior to credit events in the Latin American region. Historically credit crises in EM 
come as a result of sharp currency devaluations. Therefore, mapping out currency volatility 
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as an indicator of credit events might be better than looking at sovereign CDS spread 
changes. 
5. Conclusion: 
The informational power of credit default swaps has been a subject of importance to 
academia ever since their role in the Global Financial Crisis. Due to their relatively higher 
liquidity to bonds and OTC structure investors have adopted these contracts as a better 
mechanism for hedging credit risk or speculating on future default events. The past 
research done on the nature of corporate CDS and their price discovery power has 
provided insight into both the good and bad that has come to capital markets following 
their advent.  
One might expect the relationship observed between single-name corporate CDS 
and corresponding stock returns to translate to an aggregate country-level. Compared to 
my original hypotheses, CDS markets are do not necessarily lead equity markets in pricing 
information on sovereign credit events. Furthermore, the instances in which these results 
were statistically significant were in the case of investment grade countries and not the 
non-investment grade ones as I originally hypothesized. These results of what I originally 
conjectured. Furthermore, although statistically significant in some instances, the direction 
of the coefficients for the information flow were positive instead of negative. This makes 
any statistical significance somewhat dubious as it goes against an already empirically 
proven relationship between CDS and stocks. 
Yet it seems that the fundamental difference between systematic and idiosyncratic 
risk drivers presents a roadblock in this paper establishing a true empirical relationship 
between these two markets at a sovereign level. Although it was not the original intention, 
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this paper did add to existing literature of momentum effects in EM equity returns. 
Furthermore, it was able to illustrate how these effects change in EM of different levels of 
perceived credit risk. More specifically it was successful in noting a larger momentum 
effect among equity indices of countries with investment grade ratings. Further research 
could explore the exact nature of this contrast and whether it is attributed to liquidity 
constraints in Latin American equity markets. 
 Furthermore, there could be further research done on the nature of these credit 
events and what potential variables can at least provide some level of anticipatory 
information before markets truly take a turn for the worst. Based on the principle 
components noted by Longstaff et al. (2011) one could look at whether or not movements 
in high yield indices or the VIX lead changes in EM CDS spreads or EM equity returns. 
 Even though the relationship provided by Acharya and Johnson (2007) does not 
exist at a country level in Latin America, it would be interesting to see if this relationship 
holds at a firm level. By taking the ten most traded firms in each of the sample countries, 
one could look at corresponding CDS changes to see if the previously observed leading 
relationship exists. As a result, there should be further studies done to investigate whether 
or not there might there are insiders trading on non-public information in corporate CDS 
markets in Latin America. Perhaps future research could attempt to establish a concrete 
relationship between these two markets, while also striving to better explain the 
underdevelopments of Latin American equity markets in the regions strive for growth.  
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7. Appendix: 
 
Exhibit 1: Example of a CDS Contract 
 
 
Exhibit 2: Examples of Credit Events (per ISDA) 
 
 
Exhibit 3: Breakdown of CDS contracts by reference entity and change in reference entity 
breakdown over time 
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Exhibit 4: LAC-7 Stock Market Trade Value as a % of GDP  
 
Source: World Bank Data 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the Sample 
1= Argentina, 2= Brazil, 3= Chile, 4= Colombia, 5= Mexico, 6= Peru, 7= Venezuela 
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Table 2: Correlation between Contemporaneous CDS Returns and Lagged Equity Returns 
Argentina 
 
Brazil 
 
Chile 
 
Colombia 
 
         F5.    -0.0099   0.0076  -0.0082   0.0412   0.0083  -0.0424  -0.0761   0.0240   0.0271   0.0034   0.0324   1.0000
         F4.     0.0035  -0.0071   0.0403   0.0087  -0.0426  -0.0773   0.0245   0.0271   0.0008   0.0305   1.0000
         F3.    -0.0007   0.0401   0.0084  -0.0438  -0.0779   0.0253   0.0256   0.0003   0.0334   1.0000
         F2.     0.0400   0.0075  -0.0439  -0.0786   0.0244   0.0262  -0.0024   0.0326   1.0000
         F1.     0.0424  -0.0437  -0.0792   0.0243   0.0260  -0.0029   0.0327   1.0000
         --.     0.0348  -0.0780   0.0241   0.0269  -0.0027   0.0320   1.0000
         L1.     0.3189   0.0248   0.0268  -0.0038   0.0317   1.0000
         L2.     0.0510   0.0273  -0.0040   0.0315   1.0000
         L3.    -0.0007  -0.0038   0.0316   1.0000
         L4.     0.0010   0.0326   1.0000
         L5.     0.0409   1.0000
    indexret  
      cdsret     1.0000
                                                                                                                          
                 cdsret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret
                              L5.      L4.      L3.      L2.       L.                F.      F2.      F3.      F4.      F5.
(obs=2,910)
         F5.    -0.0462   0.0279  -0.0064   0.0124  -0.0030  -0.0488  -0.0061  -0.0048  -0.0362  -0.0207   0.0362   1.0000
         F4.     0.0090  -0.0064   0.0121  -0.0027  -0.0491  -0.0064  -0.0044  -0.0360  -0.0211   0.0362   1.0000
         F3.    -0.0060   0.0122  -0.0026  -0.0491  -0.0065  -0.0043  -0.0360  -0.0212   0.0363   1.0000
         F2.     0.0234  -0.0030  -0.0493  -0.0068  -0.0036  -0.0360  -0.0218   0.0368   1.0000
         F1.    -0.0002  -0.0488  -0.0064  -0.0036  -0.0366  -0.0216   0.0372   1.0000
         --.     0.1800  -0.0066  -0.0041  -0.0362  -0.0217   0.0368   1.0000
         L1.     0.6244  -0.0044  -0.0362  -0.0220   0.0372   1.0000
         L2.     0.0683  -0.0358  -0.0213   0.0369   1.0000
         L3.    -0.0109  -0.0213   0.0366   1.0000
         L4.    -0.0248   0.0362   1.0000
         L5.    -0.0059   1.0000
    indexret  
      cdsret     1.0000
                                                                                                                          
                 cdsret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret
                              L5.      L4.      L3.      L2.       L.                F.      F2.      F3.      F4.      F5.
(obs=4,122)
         F5.    -0.0084  -0.0174   0.0293  -0.0118   0.0135  -0.0268  -0.0380   0.0195  -0.0066   0.0356   0.1335   1.0000
         F4.    -0.0126   0.0290  -0.0115   0.0140  -0.0270  -0.0380   0.0197  -0.0063   0.0356   0.1337   1.0000
         F3.     0.0044  -0.0116   0.0142  -0.0268  -0.0379   0.0197  -0.0063   0.0357   0.1337   1.0000
         F2.     0.0236   0.0141  -0.0267  -0.0377   0.0197  -0.0063   0.0357   0.1338   1.0000
         F1.    -0.0027  -0.0268  -0.0376   0.0197  -0.0061   0.0357   0.1338   1.0000
         --.     0.1422  -0.0377   0.0198  -0.0060   0.0359   0.1337   1.0000
         L1.     0.3149   0.0198  -0.0060   0.0358   0.1338   1.0000
         L2.     0.0995  -0.0061   0.0359   0.1341   1.0000
         L3.     0.0220   0.0354   0.1344   1.0000
         L4.    -0.0094   0.1341   1.0000
         L5.    -0.0039   1.0000
    indexret  
      cdsret     1.0000
                                                                                                                          
                 cdsret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret
                              L5.      L4.      L3.      L2.       L.                F.      F2.      F3.      F4.      F5.
(obs=3,866)
         F5.    -0.0068   0.0376   0.0594   0.0147  -0.0014  -0.0567  -0.0263  -0.0008  -0.0296   0.0128   0.1389   1.0000
         F4.    -0.0433   0.0593   0.0147  -0.0016  -0.0567  -0.0262  -0.0003  -0.0293   0.0131   0.1389   1.0000
         F3.    -0.0047   0.0147  -0.0015  -0.0567  -0.0262  -0.0002  -0.0292   0.0131   0.1390   1.0000
         F2.    -0.0328  -0.0015  -0.0566  -0.0261  -0.0002  -0.0290   0.0135   0.1391   1.0000
         F1.     0.0164  -0.0565  -0.0260  -0.0001  -0.0290   0.0136   0.1394   1.0000
         --.     0.0735  -0.0259   0.0000  -0.0289   0.0138   0.1397   1.0000
         L1.     0.4809   0.0000  -0.0288   0.0137   0.1397   1.0000
         L2.     0.1323  -0.0288   0.0137   0.1397   1.0000
         L3.     0.0482   0.0136   0.1397   1.0000
         L4.     0.0023   0.1397   1.0000
         L5.    -0.0204   1.0000
    indexret  
      cdsret     1.0000
                                                                                                                          
                 cdsret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret
                              L5.      L4.      L3.      L2.       L.                F.      F2.      F3.      F4.      F5.
(obs=3,808)
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Mexico 
 
Peru 
 
Venezuela 
 
 
                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         F5.     0.0216   0.0019  -0.0169   0.0052   0.0080   0.0242  -0.0069  -0.0272  -0.0259  -0.0011   0.1190   1.0000
         F4.     0.0043  -0.0166   0.0061   0.0102   0.0247  -0.0076  -0.0267  -0.0254  -0.0006   0.1189   1.0000
         F3.    -0.0069   0.0060   0.0100   0.0245  -0.0077  -0.0265  -0.0254  -0.0007   0.1189   1.0000
         F2.    -0.0174   0.0102   0.0249  -0.0066  -0.0263  -0.0257  -0.0004   0.1191   1.0000
         F1.     0.0502   0.0248  -0.0065  -0.0256  -0.0255  -0.0003   0.1193   1.0000
         --.     0.1420  -0.0064  -0.0252  -0.0245  -0.0001   0.1191   1.0000
         L1.     0.5986  -0.0248  -0.0243  -0.0006   0.1190   1.0000
         L2.     0.1156  -0.0243  -0.0003   0.1195   1.0000
         L3.     0.0019  -0.0002   0.1204   1.0000
         L4.    -0.0055   0.1203   1.0000
         L5.    -0.0107   1.0000
    indexret  
      cdsret     1.0000
                                                                                                                          
                 cdsret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret
                              L5.      L4.      L3.      L2.       L.                F.      F2.      F3.      F4.      F5.
(obs=4,196)
         F5.    -0.0133   0.0377   0.0009   0.0323   0.0383  -0.0064   0.0428   0.0629   0.0633   0.0521   0.1782   1.0000
         F4.     0.0024   0.0007   0.0323   0.0384  -0.0063   0.0429   0.0630   0.0634   0.0521   0.1783   1.0000
         F3.     0.0156   0.0322   0.0384  -0.0063   0.0429   0.0630   0.0635   0.0522   0.1783   1.0000
         F2.    -0.0067   0.0384  -0.0063   0.0429   0.0630   0.0635   0.0522   0.1783   1.0000
         F1.    -0.0107  -0.0065   0.0429   0.0630   0.0636   0.0522   0.1784   1.0000
         --.     0.0717   0.0429   0.0630   0.0636   0.0523   0.1784   1.0000
         L1.     0.4656   0.0630   0.0636   0.0523   0.1784   1.0000
         L2.     0.1415   0.0635   0.0524   0.1784   1.0000
         L3.     0.0573   0.0523   0.1784   1.0000
         L4.     0.0507   0.1784   1.0000
         L5.     0.0569   1.0000
    indexret  
      cdsret     1.0000
                                                                                                                          
                 cdsret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret
                              L5.      L4.      L3.      L2.       L.                F.      F2.      F3.      F4.      F5.
(obs=3,730)
         F5.     0.0092   0.0143   0.0443   0.0371  -0.0469   0.0112   0.0404   0.0123   0.1104   0.1929   0.2369   1.0000
         F4.     0.0187   0.0442   0.0371  -0.0470   0.0111   0.0402   0.0123   0.1105   0.1929   0.2369   1.0000
         F3.     0.0023   0.0366  -0.0470   0.0115   0.0396   0.0118   0.1103   0.1930   0.2372   1.0000
         F2.    -0.0308  -0.0482   0.0115   0.0402   0.0099   0.1083   0.1923   0.2372   1.0000
         F1.    -0.0110   0.0115   0.0402   0.0173   0.1084   0.1925   0.2375   1.0000
         --.     0.0297   0.0405   0.0173   0.1095   0.1928   0.2378   1.0000
         L1.    -0.0001   0.0185   0.1093   0.1943   0.2391   1.0000
         L2.     0.0223   0.1104   0.1941   0.2409   1.0000
         L3.    -0.0043   0.1957   0.2431   1.0000
         L4.     0.0194   0.2429   1.0000
         L5.    -0.0222   1.0000
    indexret  
      cdsret     1.0000
                                                                                                                          
                 cdsret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret indexret
                              L5.      L4.      L3.      L2.       L.                F.      F2.      F3.      F4.      F5.
(obs=3,709)
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Exhibit 5: CDS (Blue) and Equity Market (Green) Prices for the LAC-7 Sample (per 
Bloomberg) 
 
Argentina  
 
 
Brazil 
 
 
Chile 
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Colombia 
 
 
Mexico 
 
 
Peru 
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Venezuela 
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Table 3: First Stage Individual Time Series Regressions 
1= Argentina, 2= Brazil, 3= Chile, 4= Colombia, 5= Mexico, 6= Peru, 7= Venezuela 
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Table 4: Entire Sample of LAC-7 
Here we observe the effect of unconditional and conditional lagged CDS innovations and lagged equity returns 
on contemporaneous equity returns. We define the credit event under two different specifications (A) a day-to-
day CDS spread jump exceeding 50 basis points for investment grade countries and 100 basis points for non-
investment grade countries; (B) a day-to-day jump in CDS spreads exceeding four standard deviations above the 
average CDS spread jump in the sampling period. 
 
z-values displayed below coefficients in parentheses 
*     Significance at 10% level 
**   Significance at 5% level 
*** Significance at 1% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
5 days 
 
Spec A 
30 days 
 
 
90 days 
 
 
5 days 
 
Spec B 
30 days 
 
 
90 days 
𝒂 0.00083*** 
(2.92) 
0.00082*** 
(2.86) 
0.00082*** 
(2.97) 
0.00081*** 
(2.92) 
0.00081*** 
(2.88) 
0.00080*** 
(3.05) 
∑ 𝒃𝒌
𝟓
𝒌=𝟏   -0.02518 
(1.38) 
-0.02153 
 (1.10) 
-0.02124 
(1.23) 
-0.01798 
(0.96) 
-0.01665 
 (0.86) 
-0.01492 
(0.89) 
∑ 𝒃𝒌
𝑫𝟓
𝒌=𝟏   0.06583* 
(1.95) 
0.02179 
(0.72) 
0.01288 
(0.47) 
0.01619 
(0.17) 
0.02179 
(0.72) 
-0.00142 
(0.04) 
∑ 𝒄𝒌
𝟓
𝒌=𝟏   0.21199** 
(2.19) 
0.21476** 
(2.24) 
0.21082** 
(2.24) 
0.21285** 
(2.20) 
0.20783** 
(2.15) 
0.18975 
(0.04) 
∑ 𝒄𝒌
𝑫𝟓
𝒌=𝟏   0.18795 
(1.18) 
-0.01661 
(0.17) 
0.02726 
(0.56) 
0.00431 
(0.04) 
0.17220*** 
(2.64) 
0.02726 
(5.04) 
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Table 5: Sample with Investment Grade Countries 
Here we observe the same regression results from Table 1, but with only the investment grade countries of the 
sample (Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru). 
 
z-values displayed below coefficients in parentheses 
*     Significance at 10% level 
**   Significance at 5% level 
*** Significance at 1% level  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
5 days 
 
Spec A 
30 days 
 
 
90 days 
 
 
5 days 
 
Spec B 
30 days 
 
 
90 days 
𝒂 0.00098** 
(2.08) 
0.00099** 
(2.08) 
0.00097** 
(2.08) 
0.00097** 
(2.05) 
0.00097** 
(2.08) 
0.00093** 
(2.13) 
∑ 𝒃𝒌
𝟓
𝒌=𝟏   -0.04068*** 
(4.52) 
-0.04269*** 
 (3.78) 
-0.03837*** 
(2.78) 
-0.03506*** 
(3.44) 
-0.03411*** 
 (2.97) 
-0.02901* 
(1.86) 
∑ 𝒃𝒌
𝑫𝟓
𝒌=𝟏   0.07739*** 
(2.83) 
0.07172** 
(1.98) 
0.04201 
(1.10) 
0.12929* 
(1.78) 
0.79528 
(0.30) 
0.00976 
(0.16) 
∑ 𝒄𝒌
𝟓
𝒌=𝟏   0.29956*** 
(4.55) 
0.29768*** 
(4.43) 
0.29263*** 
(4.30) 
0.30224*** 
(4.77) 
0.29759*** 
(4.71) 
0.27769*** 
(4.70) 
∑ 𝒄𝒌
𝑫𝟓
𝒌=𝟏   0.33263 
(1.34) 
0.13395 
(1.44) 
0.10393 
(1.52) 
-0.00915 
(0.10) 
0.14285*** 
(4.48) 
0.10393*** 
(11.19) 
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Table 6: Sample with Non-Investment Grade Countries 
Here we observe the same regression results from Table 1, but with only the non-investment grade countries of 
the sample (Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela). 
 
z-values displayed below coefficients in parentheses 
*     Significance at 10% level 
**   Significance at 5% level 
*** Significance at 1% level 
 
  
 
5 days 
 
Spec A 
30 days 
 
 
90 days 
 
 
5 days 
 
Spec B 
30 days 
 
 
90 days 
𝒂 0.00133** 
(2.10) 
0.00132** 
(2.02) 
0.00131** 
(2.10) 
0.00131** 
(2.10) 
0.00130*** 
(2.05) 
0.00124*** 
(2.07) 
∑ 𝒃𝒌
𝟓
𝒌=𝟏   -0.02737 
(0.89) 
-0.01962 
 (0.60) 
-0.01686 
(0.58) 
-0.01305 
(0.41) 
-0.01089 
 (0.34) 
-0.00324 
(0.12) 
∑ 𝒃𝒌
𝑫𝟓
𝒌=𝟏   0.06749** 
(2.53) 
0.02309 
(1.27) 
-0.00393 
(0.13) 
-0.08015 
(0.40) 
-0.09856 
(0.79) 
-0.06194*** 
(7.96) 
∑ 𝒄𝒌
𝟓
𝒌=𝟏   0.23538* 
(1.81) 
0.24097* 
(1.90) 
0.23744* 
(1.89) 
0.23360* 
(1.74) 
0.22873* 
(1.71) 
0.20368 
(1.55) 
∑ 𝒄𝒌
𝑫𝟓
𝒌=𝟏   0.05171 
(0.98) 
-0.10313 
(1.10) 
-0.01922 
(0.44) 
-0.17540* 
(1.93) 
0.11048 
(1.07) 
-0.01922*** 
(2.97) 
